US may have been adverse to using nuclear weapons during Korean War but unfortunately the crazies in Washington Epstein class elites have no morality, so not sure if they would avoid using nuclear weapons. I do worry that Israel will use nuclear weapons against Iran, and Starmer/Macron/Merz will proclaim the next day that Israel has the right to defend itself; Albanese and Carney will say Iranians are oppressed and being liberated with nuclear weapons. The crazies rule in the West.
Very good analysis, though I can't imagine China expanding past absorbing Taiwan, which is part of China anyway. To aggressively expand, as our MIC wants us to believe is China's objective, goes against over 2000 years of Chinese history.
Guam won't have anything to worry about unless the US provokes a war with China, which is exceedingly unlikely now.
Godfree, this is a very thoughtful piece and I broadly agree with the structural point you raise.
The recent Iranian missile strikes on U.S. bases in the Middle East provide a useful real-world illustration of the issue you describe. Even a regional power with far fewer resources than China was able to launch large missile and drone salvos against fixed U.S. installations across the region, forcing the United States and its partners to rely heavily on Patriot and THAAD interceptors. The episode highlights something fundamental about modern warfare: fixed overseas bases, once the backbone of power projection, are increasingly exposed in an era of precision missiles and mass strike capabilities.
If this dynamic already creates pressure in the Middle East, the implications in the Western Pacific would be far larger. In a Taiwan contingency, U.S. facilities across Japan, Guam, and potentially parts of Southeast Asia would immediately become high-value targets for the PLA’s missile forces. China’s inventory of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles—combined with its geographic proximity to the theater—would make these bases among the first objects of attack in the opening phase of any conflict.
In that sense, the question you raise becomes unavoidable: any U.S. decision to intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict would have to confront the reality that many of these forward bases could become the earliest casualties of the war. And if that vulnerability becomes structurally unavoidable, it would also imply that the long-standing U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific could gradually erode—and eventually give way to a very different regional balance.
US may have been adverse to using nuclear weapons during Korean War but unfortunately the crazies in Washington Epstein class elites have no morality, so not sure if they would avoid using nuclear weapons. I do worry that Israel will use nuclear weapons against Iran, and Starmer/Macron/Merz will proclaim the next day that Israel has the right to defend itself; Albanese and Carney will say Iranians are oppressed and being liberated with nuclear weapons. The crazies rule in the West.
Very good analysis, though I can't imagine China expanding past absorbing Taiwan, which is part of China anyway. To aggressively expand, as our MIC wants us to believe is China's objective, goes against over 2000 years of Chinese history.
Guam won't have anything to worry about unless the US provokes a war with China, which is exceedingly unlikely now.
Time to realize War is obsolete .
Peace isn’t for the fearful .
Surely war is too profitable to ever become obsolete?!
Is it profitable for the country ? Sure doesn’t look like it with basic infrastructure neglected and its economy failing .
A few profit certainly .
It's what your mother used to do when you got hold of a knife as a child: distract you with something more interesting. China will do exactly that.
Unfortunately!
Fake Jew bucks rule at present, but it will change.
Godfree, this is a very thoughtful piece and I broadly agree with the structural point you raise.
The recent Iranian missile strikes on U.S. bases in the Middle East provide a useful real-world illustration of the issue you describe. Even a regional power with far fewer resources than China was able to launch large missile and drone salvos against fixed U.S. installations across the region, forcing the United States and its partners to rely heavily on Patriot and THAAD interceptors. The episode highlights something fundamental about modern warfare: fixed overseas bases, once the backbone of power projection, are increasingly exposed in an era of precision missiles and mass strike capabilities.
If this dynamic already creates pressure in the Middle East, the implications in the Western Pacific would be far larger. In a Taiwan contingency, U.S. facilities across Japan, Guam, and potentially parts of Southeast Asia would immediately become high-value targets for the PLA’s missile forces. China’s inventory of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles—combined with its geographic proximity to the theater—would make these bases among the first objects of attack in the opening phase of any conflict.
In that sense, the question you raise becomes unavoidable: any U.S. decision to intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict would have to confront the reality that many of these forward bases could become the earliest casualties of the war. And if that vulnerability becomes structurally unavoidable, it would also imply that the long-standing U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific could gradually erode—and eventually give way to a very different regional balance.
If bases are obsolete for the US, shouldn't they be obsolete for China as well? Why man the Great Wall of Sand in the Spratly and Paracel Islands?